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Credit Rating Agencies' Ratings in Debt Default Models
Sovereign credit ratings and their associated default probabilities have historically been used by leading international banks for determining their capital allocation in a particular country, pricing of sovereign bonds and loans and, most importantly, as an input to their credit risk management models. Such credit ratings and default probabilities are traditionally provided by the leading credit rating agencies (CRAs). According to the Basel Capital Accord -Basel II, banks were allowed to use their internal sovereign ratings and/or CRA's ratings and their associated default rates in determining their required regulatory capital against credit risk. When this is applied to emerging markets, due to the lack of data on sovereigns, the sovereign credit ratings are mainly based on corporate defaults, assuming the latter is a good proxy for the former. However, Moreover, political and institutional factors are very important determinants of probability of default as they affect country's stability and debt repayment policies. Further, financial ratios that have most commonly been identified in literature as significant determinants of probability of sovereign default are: Reserves to Imports (e.g., Aylward and Thorne, 1998) ; Total External
Debt to GDP (e.g., Balkan, 1992, Detragiache and Spilmbergo, 2000 etc.) ; and Total Debt Service Payment to Exports (e.g., Solberg, 1988 and Rivoli and Brewer, 1997) . Finally, it has been documented that a country's past debt repayment record can be used as an excellent indicator of their current likelihood to default. The list of variables that could potentially affect sovereign default presented here is not exhaustive, so for more detailed review of these and other variables see Georgievska et al. (2008) . To select the most appropriate variables out of a large pool, which could be used in building an empirical model for estimating probability of sovereign default, we deploy the Principal Component Analysis technique. Our selection methodto adopt variables that can be grouped into four main categories and are expected to have either positive or negative impact on probability of rescheduling as described in Table ZZZ .1: (b) When the imports in relation to the GDP are higher, the country is more vulnerable to foreign shocks, and more likely to external debt rescheduling (Frenkel, 1983) . However, (Odedokun, 1995) argues that the higher this ratio, the more open the economy is, which in effect reduces the probability of default.
The event of debt default/rescheduling is defined as a binary variable:
In our sample there were 519 debt defaults/reschedulings 3 in total. Although 22 countries had no defaults in this period, some, for example Gabon, Zambia, Tanzania and Nicaragua faced a dozen or more default/rescheduling events.
Applying the panel logit models, traditionally used in this setting, we estimated the probabilities of sovereign default in emerging market countries in our sample. In search for the most accurate model we considered those which: 1) maximise percent of correct predictions (that the default had occurred) and 2) minimise the 'false negatives', i.e. minimise the error that the actual defaults are classified by the model as non-defaults (known as Type I error). Using the variables if country i reschedules its external debt in year t, i.e. if its total amount of debt recheduled is above zero in year t if country i does not reschedule its external debt in year t
Recheduling it
described earlier, we have derived two models that satisfy criterion 1) and 2) respectively and give us empirical estimates of debt rescheduling probabilities in emerging markets. Overall, our determinants of debt rescheduling suggest that in order to reduce their probability of default/rescheduling and get better access to international capital markets, emerging countries should: maintain a good past debt repayment record; reduce their current account deficit;
improve their political stability; increase their exports relative to imports; keep close control of international reserves relative to GDP (which is of particular relevance for countries with underdeveloped banking system); and limit the size of the external debt compared to their resource base (GNP). 95.59% of the countries rated by Moody's, 85.71% of those rated by S&P and 96.3% of Fitch rated countries had lower one-year cumulative default probabilities than equivalents generated For majority of the selected countries, the one-year cumulative default rates implied from their CRAs ratings at the beginning of 2002 are very low, mostly being well below 10%, giving no signal of potential default (the exception is Indonesia, for which the S&P correctly assigns 100% probability of default). Conversely, most of the default probabilities generated by our empirical models were above 50% (particularly when Model 2 is taken into consideration), indicating that rescheduling is likely to occur. For instance, in the case of Nicaragua, Model 1 and Model 2 give very high default probabilities of 76.25% and 85.31% respectively, while Moody's assigns it a B2 rating and associated cumulative default probability of only 6.81%. This and further analysis in One of the reasons why CRAs' default rates are underestimating emerging countries sovereign defaults over one-year horizon lies in the fact that CRAs sovereign ratings are mainly based on historical corporate default rates (the exception are Fitch's ratings, which specifically follow sovereign defaults). Given that characteristics of borrowers in each case are very different (government vs. corporation), corporate bonds credit ratings and their associated default probabilities generally do not appear to be good proxies for sovereign default probabilities.
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Implications
It is well known that leading banks and international investors rely on sovereign default probabilities to estimate credit risk exposure in one country, price sovereign bonds and loans and decide upon country capital allocation. However, using CRAs default probabilities for this purpose may have serious implications for both banks and countries in question, as their problems may outweigh the benefits. For instance, CRAs continuous underestimation of sovereign default risk for emerging countries will cause underestimation of credit risk for banks, under-pricing of sovereign bonds and loans and increasing capital allocation to emerging countries with underestimated probabilities of default. Therefore, if an actual default of a sovereign occurs, it is likely that CRAs will downgrade the country rating very quickly. Then, the banks may experience difficulties in reducing the amount of capital allocation in these (now riskier) countries. Nevertheless, the capital outflows will be imminent under such circumstances. Once the considerable amount of foreign capital is withdrawn from a downgraded country, its fundamentals are likely to deteriorate further, leading subsequently to the new downgrades by CRAs and deepening of the crisis.
Finally, although this article favours the use sovereign debt default probabilities from empirical models and historical data over those provided by the CRAs, it is important to draw the attention of the reader to the cost of applying each method, which varies with the size of investors. Large financial institutions already have the analytical set-up needed for obtaining and processing the data required for the empirical models, so, in that case, the information cost of generating their own sovereign default probabilities is marginal. For individual investors, who by and large do not have adequate analytical frameworks in place, the cost advantage lies with the existing (readily available)
CRAs default probabilities, but -as this article suggests -these should be used with caution.
